Wednesday, July 10, 2013

China’s Money Shortage Reveals System’s Weakness

By Tianlun Jian

China’s economy is in crisis. Since June, investors have been preoccupied with the shortage of money in China’s financial system, but while that shortage reveals much that is wrong in China’s formerly high-flying economy, the systemic problems go far beyond tight money.
The shortage in money occurred because an increase in the demand for capital coincided with a reduction of money flowing into the system and an increase in money flowing out.
In the past few years, China’s banks began offering wealth-management products in a big way. With these financial instruments, the banks offer investors a chance to put their money into highly speculative projects in exchange for a higher rate of return. In June, the banks’ investment in wealth-management products caused the need for liquidity to soar.
Fitch, one of the three major rating agencies, released a report on June 21 suggesting that China’s banks had 1.5 trillion yuan (US$245 billion) in wealth-management products that matured at the end of June, with China’s medium-size banks having put 20 to 30 percent of their deposits in such products.
The latest research data of Puyi Investing Consulting Co. shows that in the last week of June, a total of 1592 wealth-management products offered by banks matured.
The need to pay back 1.5 trillion yuan significantly and suddenly increased the demand for yuan within a short period of time.
Less Coming In
The reduction in recent years in China’s export surplus has indirectly reduced the money supply. With less foreign exchange surplus, the amount of yuan released by the People’s Bank of China for buying U.S. dollars has correspondingly declined.
An attempt to clean up the foreign exchange system by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange has to some degree blocked the passage into China of hot money—money that moves into a market for the sake or short-term gains, further limiting the money supply.
In the past, businesses would file false export reports that would allow them to bring foreign exchange into China. They would then profit off arbitrage—trades that make money off the differences in the exchange rates and interest rates.
A new rule for strengthening the management of foreign exchange inflows has substantially reduced the amount of foreign exchange brought in through the false reporting of exports. As a result, the amount of yuan that the People’s Bank of China is obliged to convert into foreign currency has been reduced.
More Going Out
While less money is flowing into China, more money is flowing out, in part due to corruption.
More than any other single initiative, the administration of new Chinese Communist Party chief Xi Jinping has been marked by his aggressive anti-corruption campaign. Fearing losing what they stole, many senior officials have transferred their money overseas.
The corruption of CCP officials permeates China’s entire economy and complicates managing that economy. There are no statistics on how much black money there is or how much of it has been transferred abroad. Some banks may appear to have a lot of money on their books, but in fact are empty shells.
Foreign direct investment is also bringing less money into China. According to the 2013 A.T. Kearney Foreign Direct Investment Confidence Index released on June 26, the United States is the world’s best place to invest, with China demoted to second place. China’s economic outlook is not optimistic and its expected economic growth rate is only 7 percent, much lower than in the past.
Money that would have headed to China is now going to the United States. Also, some investments that were previously made have been withdrawn.
Overcapacity
With less money flowing into China, a global economic crisis reducing demand worldwide for China’s products, and the end of the high rates of increase previously reached by the Chinese economy, the bubbles in China’s economy are being exposed. In 2011, China used 60 percent of its productive capacity.
Major industries afflicted by overcapacity include chemicals, steel and iron, cement, electrolytic aluminum, flat glass, and photovoltaic cells.
Take as an example the iron and steel industry. This year, the demand for steel and iron is estimated to be about 700 million tons while the production capacity is about 1 billion tons. This May, the raw steel production was 67 million tons in China, which accounted for almost half of the global production.
According to a report by the state-run media outlet Beijing Times, Pingte Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. in Jiangxi Province went bankrupt recently because it could no longer get credit.
In fact, this company had been operating at a loss for a long time. If the company stopped production, its crisis would be immediately exposed. So the company continued production in the hope of convincing banks to believe in its ability to make a profit. However, the banks did not lend it money, and the company went bankrupt.
Many other small steel companies in China, like Pingte, face closure or have already closed. According to mysteel.com, a Chinese Internet portal dedicated to the iron and steel industry, a survey of 163 steel companies on March 8 shows that 66.87 percent of iron and steel companies are operating at a loss.
Factory closure is a result of overcapacity, overstocking, and loss of credit. Overcapacity has not only wasted money, manpower, and national resources, but has also led to massive layoffs of workers, resulting in social instability. Large amounts of credit from banks for these companies have become bad loans and uncollectible.
Markets Shaken
The money shortage has been the highly visible part of the systemic problems plaguing China’s financial system.
The most direct trigger for the crisis in June was the failure by China Everbright Bank to repay a loan to the Industrial Bank. No one knows how many banks and financial institutions face a situation similar to Everbright’s.
After Everbright defaulted, the short-term interest rate, overnight rate, and weekly rate went up sharply, with the overnight rate jumping from 2 to 3 percent to 13.44 percent.
According to Sound of Hope Radio Network, the interest rates for financial products offered by many banks and wealth-management companies in China suddenly soared recently.
For example, the Zhengzhou Branch of Huaxia Bank’s 36-day wealth-management product has an interest rate of 7 percent, while Industrial Bank’s Shenzhen offered a 31-day wealth-management product with an interest rate of 7.5 percent. The market rate before June was normally 3 to 4 percent.
A shortage of money reduces banks’ credit and people’s confidence in the economy. As the banks have recently had problems one after another, the Chinese stock market has gone down again and again.
At one point in June, the stock market had declined by 19 percent. On June 24, the stock market fell 5.3 percent in one day and suffered another drop of 5.8 percent right after the opening on June 25.
After intervention from the People’s Bank of China, the stock market rebounded a little. In fact, such intervention can only temporarily stabilize the market, but cannot fundamentally resolve the long-standing problems in China’s financial industry.
Normally the long-term interest rate moves up when people have a positive economic outlook, and the short-term interest rate goes up when capital demand increases or money supply decreases.
With China’s GDP growth rate this year expected to be only about 7 percent, far below that of previous years, the expected return on investment is naturally lower than before. However, China now has a low long-term interest rate and a short-term interest rate that is much higher than the long-term rate. This structure, called an inverse yield curve, shows that the market is not optimistic about the Chinese economy.

Source: Epoch Times

Tuesday, July 2, 2013

The Long and the Short of China’s Credit Crunch

By Tianlun Jian | July 1, 2013
The Epoch Times

News Analysis


Suddenly in early June, banks and businesses in China couldn’t get the credit they needed to operate. This was due to both short-term and long-term causes.
On June 6 a loan default triggered credit tightening. China Everbright Bank failed to repay a loan to the Industrial Bank. Subsequently, several major banks such as ICBC, Bank of China, and others closed large fund transfer services in major cities.
In several cities, banks refused to allow withdrawals on the pretense of computer glitches. In fact, the sudden constriction of credit was the problem. Within a few days the interbank overnight rate soared from 3-4 percent to 13.44 percent as of June 20.
An unintended consequence of new Communist Party leader Xi Jinping’s fight against corruption has also placed a burden on the banking system, as many senior officials have moved their money overseas.
In fact, corruption has penetrated the entire Chinese finance system. The total amount of money embezzled and the amount of money transferred overseas is unknown. Due to corruption, many Chinese banks give a false appearance of health, showing plenty of money on the books when in fact they are cash short.
The official reason for the credit crunch—apart from computer glitches—was said to be the Dragon Boat Festival, which was celebrated this year on June 12. This popular traditional Chinese holiday comes every year, and yet this year, it was said to cause a large number of withdrawals from the banking system.
In fact, in the first ten days of June, China’s new loans reached between 500 billion yuan (US $82 billion) to 1 trillion yuan (US $164 billion). This number is very large, as the monthly total for new loans in China is generally well below 1 trillion yuan (US $164 billion).
Withdrawals connected to the Dragon Boat Festival could not have caused such an unusual upsurge in new loans. I believe the main causes for the new loans, and the main, long-term causes for China’s credit crunch, can be traced to China’s local government debt and shadow banking.

Long-term Causes


Shadow banking—off-the-books loans at high interest rates mainly to private enterprise—has accounted for over 40 percent of the loan activity in China. This lending carries much higher risks.
Local officials have also put further strain on the financial system. Always trying to boost their supposed achievements, local officials continually investing in vanity projects has led to endless local debts.
Many investment projects are built by taking on new debt to repay the old debt, in the manner of a giant Ponzi scheme.
For example, if an investment was originally estimated to have a high profit, but the estimates overstated the actual performance, then a new project will be engaged for financing. As long as someone is willing to invest in the new project, that investment is used to pay for the old loans.
Local debts in China total about 20 trillion yuan (US$3.3 trillion), accounting for about 30 percent of China’s GDP. Since the financial crisis in 2008, central authorities have invested 4 trillion yuan (US$656 billion) in local projects. Local government debt has since grown.
In a March speech, Chinese central bank chief Zhou Xiaochuan said, “20 percent of local government debt is quite dangerous, because these projects contribute no fiscal income.”
As much as one third of the current new local governmental debt is used to cover old debt. The sharp increase in new loans is surely related to the flood of local governmental debt.
Overall, today’s credit crunch is no accident. Structural problems have long existed in China’s banking system. In addition, there are problems of excessive infrastructure investment, the housing bubble, and so on.

Stock Market Crash


At first, the Chinese central bank seemed to ignore the credit crunch and provided no liquidity.
Then the central bank saw that if the situation were allowed to continue, the stock market would likely crash. The Shanghai index dropped from 2,300 to 1,849, down by 19 percent from early June. This is a huge decline.
On June 24, it fell 5.3 percent, on June 25 it dropped another 5.8 percent. The central bank provided liquidity and announced three times that day its willingness to intervene, and the stock market finally came back a little.
While stocks slid down, banking stocks in particular took a hit. Because the credit problems started in the banking industry, it is inevitable bank shares would fall.
However, stocks in other industries also experienced a big drop. They all rely on bank loans, and, without loans, most companies could no longer continue to operate normally. Their cash flow will break down, which may even lead to bankruptcy.
The tightening of credit, then, has put everything at great risk and had a major impact on the entire economy.

The liquidity provided by central bank can only temporarily ease the money shortage. It won’t solve the fundamental finance problem facing China today.

Source: The Epoch Times

Saturday, April 27, 2013

Will Boosting Domestic Demand Help China?


Click here to watch the NTDTV Video Interview.


In China today, the economic Troika has stopped working. In addition, the macro-control has often been interrupted. On April 25th, the Standing Committee held a meeting to study the current economic situation and related tasks.

Observers point out, China's current economic predicament has tightened the space for macro-control policies. Will their focus on “bringing out the potential of domestic demand” become the cure for the economic plight?

It was pointed out during the Standing Committee meeting, that China's economy still faces difficulties and challenges. Continuing implementation of fiscal policy and prudent monetary policy is necessary.

Mao Yushi, Mainland economist: "China's problems come from the microeconomics, which cannot be resolved by macroeconomic adjustments. From microeconomic perspective, there are many issues, such as the land cannot be freely traded; RMB is not internationalized; and many industries and private capital cannot enter.Food supply and the limited 295 million acres of arable land are all problems too. "

On April 25th, British Reuters published an article on China's economic realities predicament and macro-control policy. It says, the dilemma China faces today is similar to that of the global financial crisis five years ago. With the exception that there were 4 trillion Yuan economic stimulus plan at that time.

At present, option policies are very limited. Observers think, the economic Troika is no longer effective, after 30 years. Thus, it was suggested in the meeting to focus on “bringing out the potential of domestic demand.”

Mao Yushi: "Increasing GDP’s consumer spending share has many issues, like tax’ and large state enterprises’ reform. If they remain the same, there will only be limited improvement in consumption.Currently, only changing of policy can result in increasing potentials. To increase consumption, you must first increase income; without an income, how can you boost consumption?” 

The meeting also stressed on the good grasp of real estate market regulation and housing market security.

Jian Tianlun, Chinese economist in the US, believes, China’s macroeconomic policy is entirely wrong.
Due to the nationalization of land and the real estate market irregularities, housing prices continue to rise.

Jian Tianlun:“The main revenue of local governments comes from land-selling. If private ownership of land was in place, this would not happen.

Once having house and land, one does not need to hand his money over to the government.”

Jian Tianlun further points out that for these very reasons, officials have colluded with real estate developers. Officials supply them with cheap land, and in return are ‘rewarded’ with free housing units.  Thus, it is not uncommon for a person in China to own more than 100 housing units. Therefore, one can see “ghost towns” or “empty cities” popping up here and there. When these officials can obtain free housing units, they don’t mind paying the 20% tax surcharge.

Jian Tianlun: "That's why recently housing prices went up, even with 20% surcharge of tax from selling a housing unit. Simply put, the demand exceeds the supply, and the owners can add the surcharge to the selling price. The uneven distribution of wealth, and the housing price’ increase are forming a vicious cycle; the bigger the increase of house prices, the bigger the gap between rich and poor.”

The well-known U.S. investment firm GMO published a research report on China’s stimulus measures. It says that in response to the global financial crisis, and export orders collapse, China ordered the banks to lend. Last year, new bank loans were equivalent to 29% of GDP. Most of these loans flowed to the infrastructure, real estate, as well as state-owned enterprises. This stimulus would lead to terrible aftermaths, the research predicts.

The report also said that this real estate boom offers great opportunities for corruption. Land is often forcefully gained; developers underpay owners of properties; officials are addicted to kickbacks. As to infrastructure spending, local officials have many opportunities to fill their pockets too, by turning a blind eye to the poor quality of building materials. The report also noted that the systemic corruption has lowered the quality of China's economic growth. That results in a fragile financial system, environmental degradation, inadequate law enforcement, unsafe infrastructure, unresponsive public health services, and crumbling regulatory systems.



Tuesday, February 12, 2013

China’s Official Statistics Paint Grim Economic Picture

Not many people take the statistics coming out of China at face value. The Chinese regime and local governments have a long track record of manipulating or even completely fabricating economic data. However, if more reliable data is not available, the data published by the National Bureau of Statistics of China remains the only one usable for analysis. No matter how unreliable it is, this data can still provide the ability to peek into the reality of China’s economy. (Read more)

Monday, December 24, 2012

Another Aspect of Chinese Economic Trends


I read the article "Halloween decorations carry haunting message of forced labor" with fear. The message was from a product made by forced labor in China. I believe this constitutes a real part of Chinese economic trends.  So I put it into my blog.

This article may help us understand why those "made-in-China" products are so cheap.  More important, readers, what can we do to help the writer and other innocent people in the labor camps?  Here is the article.


"The letter came in a box of Halloween decorations purchased at Kmart, but for a year Julie Keith never knew. It gathered dust in her storage, a haunting plea for help hidden among artificial skeletons, tombstones and spider webs."  Click here to continue.


Thursday, December 20, 2012

Why the Party Can’t Fix the Chinese Economy


By Tianlun Jian
Income inequality is commonly recognized as a major hindrance to China’s economic and social stability and continued development. Many have observed with disbelief the level of polarization in China, and wondered what has gone wrong with the system.
Nothing, in fact, went wrong. The state machine has executed precisely the ideas of Deng Xiaoping, the designer of China’s current economic model.
When Deng first laid the framework of economic reforms, his goal was to maintain the rule and absolute power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), controlled by a small group of men. At that time, China had just finished the Cultural Revolution, and the economy had been shattered by a decade of chaos.
To pull the CCP out of the mess, Deng knew that he had to grow the economy. But equal opportunity was never part of the plan. He stated clearly that the reforms aimed to “let some people get rich first.” Of course, those in the center of the circle of power, and those close to them, were the “some people” who got rich first.
Corruption grew rampant as officials used every opportunity to abuse political power and thus gain economic benefits. The rapidly widening income gap and inflation created anger at the grassroots level. To protest official corruption, college students took to the streets in 1989 calling for justice and democracy, which ended in the notorious Tiananmen Square massacre.
After the incident, Deng stressed that “development is of overriding importance” and “maintaining stability is the top priority,” in part to justify the massacre. These ideas then became the guiding principles that led to the complete disregard for the well-being of ordinary people.
The fundamental macroeconomic policies of reliance on exports, investment-driven growth, the handing out of monopolies to state-owned enterprises, and low interest rates to plunder wealth from households were all products of these initial ideas.
These macroeconomic principles and their byproducts—including widely discussed issues like the real estate bubble and violent land acquisitions—all served to benefit those with political power.
The most lucrative industries, like energy and telecommunications, are all state monopolies and headed by CCP officials or their family members. The power industry, for example, is controlled by former premier Li Peng’s daughter, while telecommunications are controlled by the son of former Party head Jiang Zemin.
Foreign and domestic investors often have to pay large “consultant fees” to families and friends of officials to gain permits to do business in China, or to gain favorable policies, or sometimes just to avoid trouble.
Loyalty to the CCP and its senior cadres has become the No. 1 consideration in staffing critical positions in China, including the judicial system, the education system, and the media, to ensure that policies are made to protect and maximize the benefits of these interests groups. With the entire state machine designed that way, policies that truly benefit ordinary Chinese and narrow the income gap have little chance to be passed and executed.
Examples abound. Income distribution reform, the abolition of the Hukou residential system that discriminates against people from rural areas, the appreciation of the Chinese yuan, and real anticorruption measures are just a few in a long list of initiatives that have been discussed for years but never implemented. Any of these initiatives, once carried out, will significantly block the way to greater wealth for some powerful people.
It is not realistic to expect the CCP to carry out top-down reforms that will share the spoils with the average Chinese. This is why in the future the last three decades will be seen as a period in which the CCP went further and further into a death spiral.
The Party’s cadres want to benefit from an unjust system while somehow mitigating the anger of the rest of the population. Given that genuine reform is impossible, eventually that anger will catch up with them and the Party will be no more.
With reporting by Pingping Yu.

China Faces an Inevitable Economic Failure

Thousands of job seekers flock to an employment fair in Hefei, east China's Anhui Province on Feb. 25. A decline in the housing market will create unemployment and depress other economic sectors that hinge on real estate. (STR/AFP/Getty Images)
Thousands of job seekers flock to an employment fair in Hefei, east China's Anhui Province on Feb. 25. A decline in the housing market will create unemployment and depress other economic sectors that hinge on real estate. (STR/AFP/Getty Images)
China’s economy has experienced a recent slowdown that comes as no surprise to economists who have kept the fundamental problems of the country’s macroeconomic policies in sight. China’s economic reform in the late 1970s set up the system in such a way that failure was inevitable.
The two policies at the heart of the Chinese economic model have been the over reliance on investment and exports, supported by artificially low interest rates.
High investment from the Chinese regime and foreign investors in infrastructure and manufacturing capacity has been a major driver of growth in China’s gross domestic product (GDP).
The share of investment as a part of the GDP went from 35.1 percent in 2000 to 48.4 percent in 2011. In contrast, investment in other countries generally declined to a level in the 15 to 29 percent range. To put it simply, in other countries, people are mostly buying and selling things. In China, the government is mostly building things.
The massive investment in China was spurred in part by artificially low interest rates. After accounting for inflation, these rates were at zero or negative. In other words, free money.
That money, obediently supplied by state banks, has been ploughed into infrastructure, real estate, and other big industrial projects. But there are only so many bridges, railways, and one-ton spools of copper that can be put to productive use.
For more details, click here to continue



Friday, November 30, 2012

China's Political Economic Structure Creates Inequality

By Tianlun Jian

Chinese people all like to talk about the economy, fear to discuss politics, fear to touch politics. I remember before I obtained my PhD in economics, I obtained a master's degree in political economy. My wife complained: you are studying in the Department of Economics, why do you get a degree prefixed with a "political" word, in front of the economics? At that time, I did not give more consideration. Just perfunctorily said: The school has only a master's degree.

Daron Acemoglu, Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and James Robinson, a political science professor at Harvard University jointly published a best-selling book in 2012, "Why Nations Fail."

This book analyzes the relationship between the political and economic institutions for many countries, ancient and modern, their histories, political institutions, economic institutions, and economic development and current status. The economy cannot be divorced from politics and exist independently. The book cited the lessons of the failure of many countries - exclusive political institutions and exclusive economist institutions. The book also mentions successful experience -- today's developed countries all adopt inclusive political institutions and inclusive economic institutions.

China's current macroeconomic policies all are set around the Chinese Communist regime. China's political system, economic structure, as well as their principles and policies are used to totally serve the interest Group of the CCP. So today's China has an exclusive political system, and an exclusive economic system.

One might ask, why in the past three decades, has China's economy grown so fast? It does not mean that with exclusive political institutions, the economy will no long have high growth rate.  Rather its economic growth cannot be sustained.

For example, before the 1970s, the Soviet Union also had three or four decades of high economic growth. Paul Samuelson, the world's most well-kwon economist who later won the Nobel Prize in Economics forecasted in 1961 that the Soviet Union’s GNP would exceed that of the United States as early as in 1984, or perhaps by as late as in 1997. In 1980, he still estimated the Soviet economy would overtake the United States, though the years were postponed the timing to as early as in 2002 and as late as in 2012. But it did not come true. As a matter of fact, the economy of the Soviet Union basically stagnated in the late 1970s, and only got worse in 1980s and 1990s.

Why Nations Fail also points out that current economic growth in China cannot be maintained. This is due to its political system. Unless China undergoes political reform, its growth cannot be maintained. The reason for China's higher growth in the past three decades than that of the Mao’s era, is that China went through some adjustment in its political institutions and undergone some economic reforms. The economic reforms adopted some capitalism ideas, and its economic institutions have become somewhat inclusive. But it still clings to the exclusive political and economic system, thus causing the polarization of Chinese society.

Why has the share of Chinese consumption in GDP decreased year by year? Because its macroeconomic policies are distorted, income distribution system is controlled by bigwigs who occupy a majority of the national income.

In essence, the high growth rates of China's exports and investment are developed by China's economic policies. And such policies have led to the decline in income share of the Chinese residents in GDP, year after year. For example, Chinese exports rely on the long-term rmb undervaluation. Such economic losses are born by the Chinese nationals. The high investment growth is built on the basis of low real interest rates.

In the nine years between 2003 and 2011, the average real deposit interest rates were almost zero, yet its GDP grew at double digit rates during the same period. This is an obvious example of mis-allocation of capital funds and mismatch between supply and demand. With a real rate on deposits almost close to zero, it means that after adjusted for inflation, Chinese depositors do not have any interest compensation for their money in the bank. From another perspective, that is to say, borrowers do not have to pay interest for borrowing money from the bank. So whoever could obtain money from the bank would gain, but who could obtain money from the bank?  State-owned enterprises, governments at all levels, and, in the past decade, land developers as well.

So, on the one hand, GDP has grown rapidly through exports and investment. On the other hand, majority of the Chinese people have not benefited much from the rapid growth. For many people, real income has not grown much. China's national savings has a strange phenomenon: on the one hand, the national savings rate is very high; on the other hand, a lot of people have very limited or no savings, therefore, they do not consume much.

It is worth noting that the high savings rate refers the overall savings rate in China, which is the average savings rate. So talking about China's high savings rate, it refers the national average savings rate. That is why nowadays Chinese people often say that they “are averaged.” In China, the very rich people save tons and tons of money. A popular jingle goes: Our village has a Billionaire Zhang, followed by nine paupers; when calculating the average, each becomes a Millionaire Zhang. This is a domestic popular jingle, a vivid description of the status quo of Chinese society.

According to the latest survey report of Chinese Family Financial Condition, about half of the Chinese people have only a very limited savings or no savings. If so, their income is only enough to purchase life necessities, and cover housing costs, health care, and education. It is impossible for luxury consumption. Maybe they have to choose the cheapest place to eat and live. In China, 75% of the savings comes from top 10% of the population. Then who are the rich in China? They are government officials, senior managers of big corporations, and real estate developers. These rich people, 10% of the population account for 75% of China’s savings, yet the poor, about 50% of the population have only limited or no savings. The serious condition of the uneven distribution of wealth in China is clear at a glance.

No matter how rich they are, consumption by the top 10% of the population is limited. And it is not possible for them to consume in proportion of their income. This is why Chinese consumption share in GDP has decreased year by year, in the past two decades, from 47% in 1990, down to only 34% in 2011. This situation is actually caused by exclusive political system and exclusive economic institutions.

With the exclusive economic institutions, the income distribution system serves for the Chinese Communist Party's exclusive political system.  As a result, Chinese national consumption share in GDP continues to decline. While it reaches the CCP’s goal of "let some people get rich first," at the same time it causes the polarization between rich and poor in the Chinese society.

When reproducing it, please make a reference to Chinese Economic Trends.

Sunday, October 28, 2012

Fundamental Problems in the Chinese Economy (II)

By Tianlun Jian


Can exports and investment continue to support high GDP growth in China?

China’s International Competitiveness Is Weaker

Fundamental Problems in the Chinese Economy (I)


By Tianlun Jian

China's economic data has dismayed investors and economists since last year.  The HSBC Purchasing Index (PMI) posted 47.9 in September, signaling an eleven month-on-month deterioration in China's manufacturing sector. Industrial output in August rose at the slowest rate in three years, and profits in the industrial sector declined 6.2 percent in August vs. a year ago, according to China's National Bureau of Statistics.

Thursday, August 2, 2012

Shanghai Composite at 41 Month Low

Source: http://www.ntdtv.ca/gb/2012/08/01/Art80780.html

The Shanghai Composite Index moved lower in back-to-back sessions to a fresh 41-month low at close yesterday, settling just above 2,100. The large-cap focused CSI300 of the top Shanghai and Shenzhen listings moved into negative territory year-to-date.